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I. INTRODUCTION
Ignorance is not always bliss. Every day in the United States,
there are over one hundred million debit card transactions completed to purchase goods or services;1 however, most consumers do not
know or even care how they work–they just care that they work.
This ignorance allows the card-issuing banks to charge “hidden”
fees, known as interchange fees. Every time a debit card is swiped,
J.D. 2014, magna cum laude, Business Law Certificate with High Honors, Florida
State University College of Law; B.A., Biology and minor in Business Administration,
2011, cum laude, University of Florida. I would like to thank Professor Manual A. Utset,
Jr. for his guidance and comments. I would also like to thank my family for their unconditional love and support.
1. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). There were 37.9 billion transactions in 2009. Id.
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fees are deducted from the amount taken out of the consumer’s bank
account,2 and the remainder is deposited into the merchant’s bank
account. Since, normally, neither merchants nor consumers are fully
aware of the exact cost of the debit card interchange fees, the cardissuing bank can abuse these fees.3 Even though merchants are
aware of the fees, they likely will not stop accepting debit cards because they need to remain competitive in the market, and because
consumers want and expect to be able to use them.
Before the Durbin Amendment, interchange fees were a percentage of the transaction cost and could be negotiated between the merchants and the networks, such as Visa and MasterCard.4 Obviously,
larger merchants with a greater number of transactions were able to
negotiate lower percentage fees than smaller merchants.5 Senator
Richard Durbin and other members of Congress saw a problem with
this, so they proposed an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), seeking to
“help small businesses, merchants, and consumers by providing relief
from high interchange fees for debit card transactions.”6 The Durbin
Amendment gave the Federal Reserve Board (Board) the rulemaking
power to create regulations for debit card interchange fees so that
they “shall be reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the
issuer with respect to the transaction.”7 The Board was tasked to
take into consideration the cost per transaction for the card issuer.8
The final rule adopted by the Board provides that the interchange

2. Fees are not added to the purchase price stated when the consumer swipes his or
her card, but instead are deducted from the price stated, so the merchant does not get the
full transaction price. See Patrick C. McGinnis, Misguided Regulation of Interchange Fees:
The Consumer Impact of the Durbin Amendment, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 285, 286 (2013).
3. This was true before and after the Durbin Amendment. See infra Part III.C.
4. See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin Amendment:
How Monopolies are Offered Constitutional Protections Denied to Competitive Firms, 63
FLA. L. REV. 1307, 1315 (2011). The interchange fees were not negotiated between merchants and the card-issuing bank. Id. Networks also had the ability to create categories
based on the type of merchant or the transaction volume. See Debit Card Interchange Fees
and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,723.
5. A merchant is able to negotiate the fees with its bank, and the merchant’s bank
and the card-issuing bank can negotiate their fees. Interchange Myths and Facts,
MASTERCARD, www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/021208 MythsFacts.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2014). To avoid thousands of separate negotiations, MasterCard sets “default”
interchange rates. Id.
6. 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin) (“My amendment sought to give small businesses and merchants and their customers
across America a real chance in the fight against the outrageously high swipe fees charged
by Visa and MasterCard credit card companies.”); see also 156 CONG. REC. S3695 (daily ed.
May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010) (emphasis added).
8. See id.; Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,733.
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fees charged cannot exceed the sum of $0.21, plus five basis points of
the value of the transaction, as a fraud-prevention adjustment.9
This Note does not suggest changing the goals of the Durbin
Amendment, but instead suggests an alteration to the regulations
created by the Board. The regulations suggested in this Note aim to
better match the Amendment’s goals of being “reasonable and proportional” while taking into consideration the card issuer’s cost per
transaction. This Note suggests placing a double cap on interchange
fees.10 The suggested fees would be reasonable because they would
cap the total amount that can be charged based on the cost per
transaction, and would be proportional because they would base the
fees on a capped percentage of the purchase price. This Note does not
suggest an exact value of either cap, because it would require more
information to ensure that the caps capture the actual cost per
transaction while taking into account the number of transactions
with percentages that are potentially below the actual cost per transaction. This Note focuses primarily on the three parties participating
in the two-sided market: (1) the merchant, (2) the consumer, and (3)
the card-issuing bank. There are other parties involved in the debit
card transfer, but their role in the realm of interchange fees is minimal.11 These three parties are in a two-sided market because the
card-issuing bank’s goal is to make sure that both merchants and
consumers want to use its card. This is a careful balancing act because
both merchants’ and consumers’ decisions are affected by fees. If the
fees are too high then merchants will not accept the card, and if merchants do not accept the card, then consumers will not want the card.
Part II examines the economic background and implementation of
the Dodd-Frank Act and then explains the Durbin Amendment’s key
parts. Part III explains how a debit card transaction takes place and
the two-sided nature of these transactions. It also discusses the hidden nature of the debit card interchange fees. Part IV discusses the
effects that the Durbin Amendment has on each of the parties, including: merchants’ cost savings or lost profits on low-priced items,
banks’ loss of revenue generation, the effect on exempted banks, and
the possibility of switching to other methods of payment.
Part V discusses the advantages and disadvantages of some potential alternatives. This Note discusses five possible alternatives to
this problem: (1) leave the Durbin Amendment “as is;” (2) repeal the
Durbin Amendment and return to a pre-amendment status with no
regulation; (3) have no interchange fees; (4) change the Amendment
9. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,404 (July 20,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
10. See infra Part V.E.
11. See infra Part III.A.
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to cap the fees on the percentage of the sale; or (5) change the
Amendment to cap fees on the percentage of the sale price while capping the total interchange fees. Ultimately this Note will suggest an
alteration to the Durbin Amendment that caps both the fees based on
a percentage of the sale price and the total amount allowed in interchange fees, so that the regulation more closely tracks the Amendment’s goal of being “reasonable and proportional.”
II. DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT
A. History of the Financial Crisis and Implementation of the DoddFrank Act
The U.S. Government passed the Glass-Steagall Act after the
Great Depression, which created banking regulations.12 However, in
1999, President Clinton repealed many of the banking regulations
that were established under the Glass-Steagall Act.13 Many people
believe that one cause of the 2008 financial crisis was the deregulation of the banking industry and the fact that new regulations were
needed to rehabilitate the economy.14
On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act became law.15 The DoddFrank Act’s goal, as stated in its short title, is “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect the consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”16 Whether the Dodd-Frank Act is meeting this goal is a topic
for many other articles.
B. Durbin Amendment
A few months after the Dodd-Frank Act was passed, Senator Durbin recommended an addition, seeking to help small businesses.17
This addition can be found in section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
entitled “Reasonable Fees and Rules for Payment Card Transactions,” but is commonly referred to as the Durbin Amendment.18 The

12. See McGinnis, supra note 2, at 292.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 292-93.
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010); McGinnis, supra note 2, at 293.
16. Dodd-Frank Act § 1.
17. See 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
18. Dodd-Frank Act § 1075.
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Durbin Amendment, which took effect on October 1, 2011, adds section 920 to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA).19
Before the Dodd-Frank Act, debit networks incorporated an ad
valorem percentage to determine the interchange fees for each
transaction.20 Networks also had the ability to create categories
based on the type of merchant or the transaction volume.21 Before
the Durbin Amendment, the average interchange fee was between
1.15% and 1.35% of the transaction cost, and averaged approximately
$0.47 per transaction.22
1. Reasonable and Proportional
The Durbin Amendment gave the Board the rulemaking power to
create regulations “regarding any interchange transaction fee that
an issuer may receive or charge with respect to an electronic
debit transaction.”23 The principle provided as guidance to the Board
was that the interchange transaction fees “shall be reasonable and
proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to
the transaction.”24
2. Considerations
The Board was directed to consider the “functional similarity” between debit transactions and checking transactions that clear at par,
as well as “the incremental cost incurred by an issuer for the role of
the issuer in the authorization, clearance, or settlement of a particular electronic debit transaction.”25 However, the Board was not to
consider “other costs incurred by an issuer which are not specific to a
particular electronic debit transaction.”26
The Board requested public comment, as is required in the rulemaking process, to determine an interchange fee for debit transaction
that shall be “reasonable and proportional to the cost[s] incurred.”27

19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2012); Dodd-Frank Act § 1075.
20. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,724 (proposed
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
21. See id. at 81,723.
22. Richard A. Epstein, The Dangerous Experiment of the Durbin Amendment: Congress’ Interchange Fee Limit is a Reckless Exercise in Price Regulation, REG.: CATO REV.
BUS. & GOV’T, Spring 2011, at 24, 25; CADY NORTH, BUSINESS IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK
DEBIT FEE CAP, BLOOMBERG GOV’T STUD. 12 (Lisa Getter ed., 2011).
23. Dodd-Frank Act § 1075.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id. See infra Part III for an explanation of a check clearing at par.
26. Dodd-Frank Act § 1075.
27. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,722 (proposed
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). See infra Part II.B.1.
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The Board originally proposed two alternatives.28 Alternative
one combined a cap of $0.12 per transaction and a safe-harbor level
of $0.07 per transaction.29 Alternative two was simply a cap of
$0.12 per transaction.30
The Board received over 11,500 comments from “issuers, payment
card networks, merchants, consumers, consumer advocates, trade
associations, and members of Congress.”31 The merchants suggested
lowering the cap so that the savings could be passed along to consumers because the costs were significantly below the $0.12 cap.32
Merchants also suggested prohibiting exclusivity arrangements to
increase competition.33 On the other hand, payment card networks,
such as Visa and MasterCard, were concerned that the cap would
decrease revenue for card-issuing banks, which would increase cardholder fees and decrease benefits for merchants and consumers.34 After considering all the comments, the Board adopted a modified version of alternative two.35
3. Fraud Prevention
In addition, the Durbin Amendment allows the Board to create an
adjustment to the interchange fees if the “adjustment is reasonably
necessary to make allowance for costs incurred by the issuer in preventing fraud in relation to electronic debit transactions involving
that issuer; and the issuer complies with the fraud-related standards
established by the Board.”36 The goal of this addition is to encourage
the card-issuing bank to take necessary actions to prevent fraud.37
4. Small Bank Exemption
The Durbin Amendment does not apply to any card issuer that
has less than $10 billion in assets.38 These “small issuers” will not
28. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,736.
29. See id. at 81,736, 81,755.
30. Id. at 81,738, 81,756.
31. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,394 (July 20,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
32. See id. at 43,402.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 43,404.
36. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2069 (2010).
37. Id.; Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,404 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2 (2012). The value of the assets was raised from $1 billion to
the $10 billion in order to get enough votes. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1326; see also, M.
Pierce Sandwith, Note, Debit Card Interchange Fees and the Durbin Amendment’s Small
Bank Exemption, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 223, 234-36 (2012).
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have to prescribe to the Board’s regulations of debit card interchange
transaction fees and can instead charge whatever fee they need to or
can.39 Only three credit unions and approximately sixty banks have
enough assets to be affected by the Durbin Amendment, while approximately 7500 credit unions and 7000 banks are exempt.40 One
reason for this exemption to the cap on interchange fees is that
smaller banks have fewer transactions, and thus, they have fewer
transactions across which they can spread their fixed costs.41
5. Final Rule
The final rule adopted by the Board is an adaptation to alternative two and provides that the interchange fees charged cannot exceed the sum of $0.21, plus five basis points of the value of the transaction, as a fraud-prevention adjustment.42
III. DEBIT CARDS AND INTERCHANGE FEES
When consumers want to purchase goods or services, they have a
variety of payment options, including but not limited to: cash,43
check,44 debit card, or credit card. However, consumers are increasingly shifting to electronic payment methods such as debit and credit
cards.45 This is good news for merchants, because they have an informational asymmetry problem when consumers pay with checks,
39. Sandwith, supra note 38, at 235-36.
40. Epstein, supra note 22, at 24.
41. See David C. John, The Durbin Debit Card Interchange Fee Cap Hurts Consumers,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 17, 2011), http://report.heritage.org/wm3194.
42. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,404 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). See supra Part II.B for a more detailed explanation of the
Durbin Amendment.
43. In cash payments the purchaser provides the merchant with cash equal to the
amount of purchase price. The risk that the merchant will not get paid does not exist here
because goods and services are not exchanged without the full value of the cash unless
otherwise agreed upon (under certain circumstances such as contracts or the delivery of
goods, payment might not be tendered until after the goods are received). The downside of
cash payments for merchants is there is a risk of theft from employees or outsiders. Additionally, the payments are not automatically deposited, so the merchant or merchant’s
employees have to manually transfer the cash to the merchant’s bank.
44. In a check payment, the purchaser provides a check for the amount of the purchase price. After the merchant receives the check, the merchant has to manually transfer
the checks to the merchant’s banks because the deposit is not automatic. In the past few
years there have been improvements in check depositing, such as being able to deposit
checks by using the camera on your mobile phone. See, e.g., Press Release, Sun National
Bank, Sun National Bank Launches SunMobile Deposit (Oct. 8, 2013), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO- 20131008-906737.html. This only eliminates the deposit problem and not the risk of adequate funds. Furthermore, check writing is timeconsuming and will slow down the checkout process, which may lead to merchants needing
to staff more employees. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1317.
45. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
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since merchants have no information about the consumers’ financial
positions.46 Additionally, consumers often make larger purchases
with debit cards and credit cards than they would with cash.47
Checks normally clear “at par,” and therefore, the merchant receives the full value of the check without fees.48 On the other hand,
credit and debit cards both have interchange fees, but these higher
fees are paid in exchange for greater merchant and consumer benefits, such as convenience and assuring the merchant that there are
available funds.49 Merchants are essentially paying for the option to
have more information about the consumers’ financial positions, and
to avoid making irreversible decisions without having all of the information.50 Both debit cards and credit cards also eliminate the hassle and risk of having and processing cash or check payments.51
A. Debit Card Transactions
Debit card usage has rapidly increased since the mid-1990s and is
the fastest-developing form of electronic payment.52 The Durbin
Amendment defines a debit card as “any card, or other payment code
or device, issued or approved for use through a payment card network to debit an asset account (regardless of the purpose for which
the account is established), whether authorization is based on signature, PIN, or other means.”53

46. In check transactions, the merchant assumes the risk that there might not be
enough money in the checking account to cover the cost of the purchase. See Epstein, supra
note 4, at 1317. The merchant also has no additional knowledge about the consumer’s financial position; therefore, the merchant has less information in these transactions than it
does in debit card transactions. Id.
47. John, supra note 41, at 1.
48. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1316. At first glance, it seems like merchants would prefer paying zero fees. However, there are some added risks, one being that the merchant
bears the risk that there might not be sufficient funds to cover the cost of the purchase,
and another being that the merchant takes this risk without any knowledge of the consumers’ financial status. Id. at 1316-17.
49. Epstein, supra note 22, at 29. Often the fees for credit cards are higher than the
debit card fee because the benefits for credit card users are generally greater. Id.
50. This is very similar to other option agreements or contracts because merchants
are purchasing the option to get more information before making a decision. See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 544 (4th pocket ed. 2011) (defining option agreement as “[a] share-transfer
restriction that commits the shareholder to sell, but not the corporation or other shareholders
to buy, the shareholder’s shares at a fixed price when a specified event occurs”).
51. See supra notes 43-44.
52. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
53. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2073 (2010).
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Most debit card transactions are processed in the following manner, commonly referred to as the “open-loop” or “four-party” system.54
The parties in this system are: the consumer; the merchant; the merchant’s bank; the debit card network (e.g., Visa or MasterCard); and
the entity that issued the debit card to the consumer, that is, the
card-issuing bank.55 When a debit card is swiped, the consumer’s
identity and bank account information is made available; however, a
signature or a personal identification number (PIN) is needed to initiate the transaction.56 The transaction information is then sent to
the merchant’s bank.57 If the transaction is authorized, then the merchant’s bank sends the transaction information to a debit-card network.58 This debit-card network connects the merchant’s bank with
the consumer’s bank.59 A network is used to relay information
through the bank that issued the consumer’s debit card.60 The consumer’s bank then verifies that there are sufficient funds and that
the card has not been reported lost or stolen.61 If there is enough
money in the consumer’s debit account, then notice of a complete
transaction is sent to the merchant through the processors, and the
purchase is finalized.62 The consumer’s bank then transfers the
transaction amount from the consumer’s account to the merchant’s
account; however, the card-issuing bank assesses interchange fees
and other processing fees at this point.63 The bank that issued the
consumer’s debit card will transfer the funds to the merchant’s account at the merchant’s bank.64 The merchant will pay their bank for
interchange fees and other processing charges at a later time.65
Merchants pay three types of fees: (1) to their bank; (2) to card
companies, e.g., Visa and MasterCard; and (3) to the card-issuing
54. This Note focuses on the four-party, or open-loop system; however, it is important
to acknowledge that there is a less commonly used “three-party” or “closed-loop” system.
See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,723, n.6. The three-party
system is different because the merchant and consumers contract directly with the network, instead of the network setting the fees. See Lisa Farrell, A Step in the Right Direction: Regulation of Debit Card Interchange Fees in the Durbin Amendment, 15 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2011).
55. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,723.
56. NORTH, supra note 22, at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
62. NORTH, supra note 22, at 8.
63. See id. The card-issuing bank takes the interchange fee before transmitting to the
merchant’s bank, so the merchant does not receive the full value of the transaction. Id.
64. McGinnis, supra note 2, at 288.
65. NORTH, supra note 22, at 8.
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bank, i.e., the consumer’s bank.66 These fees are often one of the largest portions of merchants’ costs of doing business.67 The Durbin
Amendment only regulates the interchange fees to the consumer’s
card-issuing bank.68 In an open-loop system, the interchange fees are
set by the debit card-issuing bank69 and are often the largest portion
of the fees for each transaction.70 The debit card-issuing bank and the
merchant’s bank both receive a portion of the fees.71
Under their contractual obligations to networks such as Visa and
MasterCard, merchants are not allowed to assess a surcharge on consumers who use debit cards or credit cards instead of other payment
methods.72 The consumer does not directly see the effects of the interchange fees; instead, the fees are incorporated into the price of the
goods or services as a cost to the merchant.73
B. Debit Card Market
Electronic payment tools such as debit cards and credit cards operate in a two-sided market.74 A two-sided market occurs during a
three-party transaction, when the middle party has an incentive to
make sure that the other two sides want to do business together.75
“[T]he ability to satisfy one side of the market depends on the continued participation of the other.”76 In debit card transactions, cardissuing banks need both merchants to accept and consumers to use
debit cards in order to stay in business. Merchants will not accept a
company’s debit card if the fees are too high or if there are no consumers using that company’s card. Conversely, consumers will not
obtain or use a company’s card if few merchants accept it or if the
66. Id.
67. Gregory D. Wasson, the CEO of Walgreens, stated that interchange fees are his
company’s fourth-largest cost after salaries, mortgages and rent, and healthcare. Epstein,
supra note 22, at 24.
68. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010).
69. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235); John, supra note 41, at 1.
70. Farrell, supra note 54, at 1083.
71. Id.
72. Id. Merchants can increase the cost of their goods or services and therefore spread
the cost of these fees among all payment methods.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1087.
75. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1323. Examples of two-sided market scenarios include
the following: (1) Newspapers put a greater-cost burden on advertisers because advertisers
will only purchase ads if enough people read the newspaper, so the cost for readers has to
be lowered to encourage more readers, Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets,
23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125, 128 (2009); and (2) Groupon tries to match businesses with customers, and typically, the fees are borne by the businesses, Epstein, supra note 4, at 1324.
76. Epstein, supra note 22, at 26.
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fees are too high.77 Therefore, card-issuing banks have to carefully
balance the interests of both parties when setting the amount of fees
and when determining who will bear the burden of those fees.78
In most two-sided markets, the fees are not shared equally.79 Typically, the party that is inelastic, i.e., less sensitive to changes in
price, will pay a greater portion of the costs.80 A merchant’s demand
for consumers is often less sensitive to changes in price than a consumer’s demand for the goods and services provided by the merchants.81 Therefore, merchants are more likely to bear a majority of
the costs associated with interchange fees.
C. The Hidden Fee
The debit card interchange fee is similar to a “hidden tax.”82 The
card-issuing banks are able to generate revenue with very little detection, because normally, neither the merchant nor the consumer is
fully aware of how much these fees cost since they are not billed separately to the merchant but instead are deducted from the amount
deposited into the merchant’s account.83 Regulations such as the
Durbin Amendment protect merchants from these hidden fees.
The consumer does not directly see the cost of the interchange
fees; instead, it is incorporated into the price of the goods or services
because it is a cost to the merchant.84 This is similar to a hidden tax
for consumers, because if they are unaware of these fees, their spending and use of the card is not affected by the price of the interchange
fee.85 However, if the listed prices are higher because of this additional merchant cost, then the consumer might be less likely to base
a purchase on the sticker shock than if the fee was added on at the
register.86 This is basic supply-and-demand economics: if the price is
77. See e.g., NORTH, supra note 22, at 15; McGinnis, supra note 2, at 301.
78. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1323. For example, online dating services want to have
an equal number of men and women, so they charge lower prices to women to attract more of
them, because women are less likely to join an online dating service than men. Id. at 1324.
79. Id.
80. Id. The Ramsey pricing principle states that a price should be set so that the
price-marginal cost margins are inversely related to the sensitivity of demand to the price;
and thus, that more revenue will be recovered from the side with a more inelastic demand.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], POLICY ROUNDTABLES: TWO-SIDED
MARKETS 12-13, 25 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf.
81. Epstein, supra note 22, at 26.
82. See generally Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009) (explaining that a hidden tax is a tax that goes unnoticed by those who pay them).
83. NORTH, supra note 22, at 8; McGinnis, supra note 2, at 288.
84. See Farrell, supra note 54, at 1083.
85. See Galle, supra note 82, at 75-77.
86. See Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON.
REV. 1145, 1146 (2009).
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higher, fewer consumers will demand the good or service; however, if
the consumer is ignorant of the higher price—because it is hidden—
then it may not affect the demand.87
Since the interchange fees are taken out of the amount deposited
into the merchant’s bank account, merchants may be unaware of the
exact cost of these fees, unless they calculate the fees themselves.
The merchants never see a bill with the total cost of the interchange
fees.88 This might explain why the cost savings post-Durbin Amendment may not have been passed along to the consumer.
The hidden nature of the interchange fees is beneficial for the
card-issuing banks because they are able to generate revenue without negative effects from either side of the two-sided market. When
banks attempt to issue more obvious fees, they often lose consumers
to other methods of payment.89
IV. EFFECTS ON THE PARTIES
Senator Durbin and other members of Congress saw a problem
with the debit card interchange fee, so they enacted the Durbin
Amendment to help small businesses.90 It remains unclear whether
the Amendment actually helps small businesses;91 however, it does
affect all three parties—the merchants, the consumers, and the card
issuers—in a variety of ways. These effects are interesting because of
the nature of the two-sided market; i.e., something that affects one
party will also affect one of the other parties.92 Keeping merchants
and consumers in the market, while simultaneously allowing the
card issuer to make a profit, is a careful balancing act. This Note will
discuss a few of the big issues and then explain the interwoven effects on the parties involved.
A. Cost Savings for Merchants
In an ideal world, merchants would pass their cost savings along
to consumers; unfortunately, the real world is more complicated than
that. Merchants save over $8 billion per year with the Durbin

87. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 82, at 75-77.
88. See supra Part III.A.
89. On September 29, 2011, Bank of America and other major banks announced a $5
monthly fee for debit cards, but due to consumer outrage, the banks had to abandon the
plan about a month later. NORTH, supra note 22, at 9.
90. 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
91. See e.g., McGinnis, supra note 2, at 285.
92. See supra Part III.B.
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Amendment interchange fees.93 If merchants do not pass these savings along to consumers, then consumers lose on both ends because
the banks have to make the lost revenue up by charging additional
fees or by cutting services.94 A decrease in debit card interchange fees
would be good for the economy if the savings were passed along to the
consumers and if consumer spending increased.
Scholars and analysts disagree on whether the savings are being
passed along to consumers. Some say that merchants are holding on
to the $8 billion in savings they received from the Durbin Amendment,95 while others argue that the savings are being passed along to
consumers.96 It is possible that merchants are unaware of their cost
savings, which would explain why they have not lowered their prices.97 There is also a possibility that card issuers will raise the interchange fees on credit cards because they are currently unregulated
by the Durbin Amendment.98 If these fees increase, there may not be
any cost savings for merchants to pass along to consumers.99
B. Lost Profits on Low-Priced Items
While high-priced items will create cost savings for merchants
with regard to the interchange fees, low-priced items will cost merchants more in fees.100 Merchants that sell items worth less than $20
will actually pay higher interchange fees than they were paying be-

93. Vicki Needham, Report: Businesses Passing on Swipe Fee Savings to Consumers,
THE HILL (Oct. 1, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financialinstitutions/325851-report-businesses-passing-on- swipe-fee-savings-to-consumers. This
also means that banks are losing $8 billion in revenue. See infra Part IV.C.
94. See infra Part IV.C.
95. The Durbin Effect: Two Years Later, Consumers Still Not Benefitting from Durbin
Amendment, ELEC. PAYMENTS COAL., http://wheresmydebitdiscount.com/the-durbin-effect/
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014). This article, however, cites a survey that looks at low-cost items,
such as milk, peanut butter, a hammer, and a Slurpee, to illustrate that the cost savings have
not been passed along. This is flawed logic because low-priced items have a higher burden with
the post-Durbin Amendment interchange fees than they did before the Durbin Amendment.
96. Vicki Needham, Retailers File Appeal Over Credit Card Swipe Fee Settlement, THE
HILL (Jan. 2, 2014, 6:19PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/194318-retailers-file-appealover-credit-card (quoting Mallory Duncan, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of
the National Retail Federation).
97. See supra Part III.C. There are also a lot of other factors that could explain the
increase in prices above inflation, such as an increase in other costs or an increase in demand for a good or service.
98. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010).
99. This also suggests that if fees and costs can be shifted to credit card interchange
fees, then the mere regulation of debit card interchange fees is a frivolous task; therefore, it
would be beneficial to also regulate the credit card interchange fees, but this idea extends
beyond this Note.
100. See infra Table 1.
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fore the Durbin Amendment.101 Approximately 20% of all debit card
purchases are for low-priced items.102 These small-ticket sales come
from coffee shops, convenience stores, fast food restaurants, and other merchants that sell items or services worth less than $20.
Before the Durbin Amendment, there was special pricing for merchants with low-cost items; however, after the Durbin Amendment,
the networks set interchange fees at the maximum amount allowed.103 Therefore, instead of using the ad valorem interchange fee,
the maximum of $0.21, plus fraud prevention, is being charged.104 As
illustrated in Table 1, when the transaction cost is below approximately $20, merchants are actually paying more in interchange fees
than they were before the Durbin Amendment.
Table 1:
BEFORE
DURBIN

AMENDMENT

AFTER DURBIN
AMENDMENT –
FEE CAP

AFTER DURBIN
AMENDMENT –
FEE CAP PLUS
FRAUD
PREVENTION

MERCHANT
SAVINGS OR
(COSTS)

Interchange fee
of 1.15% per
transaction 105

Interchange fee
of $0.21 per
transaction

Interchange fee of
$0.21 per transaction plus 0.05%

Fee Before
minus Fee
After plus
Fraud
Prevention

$1

$0.0115

$0.21

$0.2105

($0.119)

$5

$0.0575

$0.21

$0.2125

($0.155)

$10

$0.115

$0.21

$0.215

($0.1)

$20

$0.23

$0.21

$0.22

$0.01

$25

$0.2875

$0.21

$0.2225

$0.065

$38106

$0.437

$0.21

$0.229

$0.208

$50

$0.575

$0.21

$0.235

$0.34

$100

$1.15

$0.21

$0.26

$0.89

PRICE OF

TRANSACTION

101. See id.
102. Dakin Campbell & Donal Griffin, Visa, MasterCard Risk “Mom and Pop” Ire with
Debit-Fee Increase, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0923/visa-mastercard-risk-mom-and-pop-ire-with-debit-fee-increase.html.
103. Sandwith, supra note 38, at 241-42.
104. See e.g., Visa U.S.A. Interchange Reimbursement Fees, VISA 2-3, 7-8 (Apr. 20,
2013), http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-usa-interchange-reimbursement-feesapril2013.pdf.
105. NORTH, supra note 22, at 6. This is just one example of the average interchange fee.
Another source stated the average interchange fee was 1.35%. Epstein, supra note 22, at 25.
106. The average purchase price for all debit transactions is $38. NORTH, supra
note 22, at 12.
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BEFORE
DURBIN

AMENDMENT

AFTER DURBIN
AMENDMENT –
FEE CAP

AFTER DURBIN
AMENDMENT – FEE
CAP PLUS FRAUD
PREVENTION

MERCHANT
SAVINGS OR
(COSTS)

$250

$2.875

$0.21

$0.335

$2.54

$500

$5.75

$0.21

$0.46

$5.29

PRICE OF
TRANSACTION

Companies like Redbox and Starbucks that sell low-priced items
have had to raise prices to cover the increase in debit interchange
fees for their products and services.107 Redbox states the following on
its website regarding its increase in prices: “The increase is a result
of rising operational costs, including increased debit card fees.”108
Redbox raised the daily rental price from $1 to $1.20 because of the
increased fees. Redbox is also an interesting example because its business plan requires the use of a debit or credit card for all purchases, so
it cannot offset the increased costs by setting a minimum transaction
price or by switching to other payment methods. Instead, Redbox has
to pass the costs along to its consumers.109 Businesses such as coffee
shops, dollar stores, and convenience stores could offset some of the
higher fees by utilizing the minimum-purchase-price-per-transaction.
Merchants can now require a minimum purchase before allowing
a consumer to use a credit card or debit card.110 Before the DoddFrank Act, merchants would have been penalized for such requirements.111 Ideally, this would allow merchants to offset some of the
added costs of accepting debit cards for low-cost purchases. However,
merchants do not want to discourage consumers from making purchases, so merchants have little choice but to accept debit cards in
order to remain competitive.112 This forces merchants to pay the fees,
especially with respect to companies with products and services worth
less than $20.113 Companies, such as Redbox, with business models
that require the use of a debit card or credit card, and without the ability to use a minimum purchase price to offset the higher interchange
fees, cannot easily offset the added costs without raising prices.

107. General Questions: Price Change, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/pricechange
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014). There is speculation that Starbucks increased the price of some
of its items due to the increased interchange fees. See Willy Staley, Starbucks Price Hike:
Could Debit Interchange Be the Culprit?, MY BANK TRACKER (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.mybanktracker.com/news/2012/01/09/why-did-starbucks-raise-price/.
108. General Questions: Price Change, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/pricechange
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
109. Id.
110. NORTH, supra note 22, at 12.
111. Id.
112. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1319.
113. Id.

1162

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1147

C. Decrease Revenue Generation for the Banks
The Federal Reserve estimates that banks will lose around $8 billion annually due to the current interchange fees, assuming there is
no change in debit card usage.114 This is approximately half of the
roughly $16 billion that banks made in 2009.115 Card-issuing banks
will want to make up for the lost revenue in other ways. Not only are
the banks making less in interchange fees than they made in previous years, but these fees may not fully cover the cost per transaction,
because the Federal Reserve used a narrow definition of which costs
to consider when determining the cap.116
Card issuers can make up for their lost revenue by: (1) adding fees
in other places, (2) cutting back on rewards programs, (3) imposing
an annual fee, (4) raising other fees, or (5) lowering interest rates on
deposits.117 However, the card issuers have to be careful with how
they generate this revenue because they do not want to upset the
careful balance of this two-sided market.118
Card issuers will have a more difficult time imposing other nonhidden fees.119 For example, on September 29, 2011, Bank of America
announced a $5 monthly fee for debit cards, but due to consumer outrage, it had to abandon the plan approximately one month later.120
This more obvious fee was a problem for the card-issuing banks because consumers became aware of the fees. Assuming that cost savings after the final ruling on the Durbin Amendment are passed
along to consumers, the overall cost to the consumer would probably
be roughly equal to either: (1) obvious fees, i.e., monthly fees, or (2)
the higher interchange fees. However, the effect on a consumer’s
decisionmaking is greater when the fees are more obvious.121
Increased fees and decreased services make consumers worse off
than they were before the Durbin Amendment; however, for the
banks, this set-back only means that they will have to find a less obvious and more straight-forward way to recoup their revenue.122

114. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,397 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235); Needham, supra note 93.
115. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,397.
116. See John, supra note 41, at 1.
117. Id. at 2.
118. See supra Part III.B.
119. See supra Part III.C.
120. NORTH, supra note 22, at 9.
121. See supra Part III.C.
122. See NORTH, supra note 22, at 10, for a chart of the mitigation strategies for the top
ten bank-holding companies; also see id. app. at 17-18, for what these companies have told
their investors.
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D. Effect on Exempted Banks
The Durbin Amendment does not apply to any issuer that has
assets below $10 billion;123 meaning these small issuers will not have
to subscribe to the Board’s regulations of debit card interchange
transaction fees.
Small banks, though technically exempted from the Durbin
Amendment, might also have a decrease in revenue generation due to
the Durbin Amendment.124 Smaller banks have to spread their costs
over fewer transactions, and therefore, they generally have to charge
higher fees to recoup their costs.125 If the market—influenced by the
Durbin Amendment—forces smaller, exempt banks to charge lower
fees to remain competitive with the non-exempt banks, they might be
forced out of the market.126
On the surface, the exemption appears to be good for smaller
banks because they can charge higher fees.127 However, the real question is whether these banks can afford to be exempt and charge above
the cap. The cap on the Durbin Amendment interchange fees artificially lowers those fees below the competitive market-price. The
smaller banks argue there is a risk that merchants will not accept
their cards if the interchange fees are higher,128 and that the consumer would not want a card that was not accepted by merchants because it is a two-sided market.
The exempt banks have two choices: (1) lower their interchange
fees and attempt to make the revenue up elsewhere; or (2) drop out
of the market. With fewer players in the market, there is a greater
monopoly-like effect.
E. Use of Other Methods of Payment
When banks are attempting to generate revenue in other
manners, consumers might want to switch to other methods of payment, such as credit cards or cash.129 Banks will want to encourage
and incentivize consumers to use services that generate the most
revenue. Thus, if banks decide that the profit margin is not large
enough for debit cards, they may encourage consumers to switch to
other methods of payment.
123. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2070 (2010).
124. Sandwith, supra note 38, at 224 (arguing that the exemption might not be effective and instead suggesting a two-tiered system).
125. John, supra note 41, at 1.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id. at 1.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id.
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The interchange fees for credit cards are currently unregulated;
therefore, banks can generate more revenue on swipe fees, as
well as interest on late payments, without charging consumers for
the use of a credit card.130 This might, however, create potential for
abuse of the credit card swipe fees, which might eventually require
congressional regulation.
It is beneficial to encourage people to only spend the money they
have rather than borrowing from credit card companies, especially
when the economy is rocky. These spending habits can help avoid the
accrual of debt and subjection to high interest rates. A debit card is
the ideal method of payment for consumers with self-control problems.131 Debit cards make it easier for consumers to manage their finances and avoid the dangerous possibility of over-spending that
comes with credit card use.132 However, if the fees for debit cards are
too high, consumers will use other methods of payment.133
V. SOLUTIONS
Senator Durbin and other members of Congress saw a problem
with the debit card interchange fees.134 This Note considers whether
the Durbin Amendment’s intended solution was optimal. To assess
this, there are five alternative options to consider: (1) leave the Durbin Amendment “as is;” (2) repeal the Durbin Amendment and return
to a pre-amendment climate with no regulation; (3) have no interchange fee; (4) change the amendment to act as a cap on the percentage of the sale; and (5) change the amendment to cap the percentage
of the sale price while capping the total interchange fee.

130. When the economy is bad, banks may prefer debit cards because the consumers
cannot default on debit card payments. This brings up another informational asymmetry
problem: banks want bad consumers, who may default on payments or spend more than
they can afford, to use debit cards. However, banks want good consumers to use credit
cards if banks can make more money from credit cards.
131. See Manuel A. Utset, The Temporally Extended Family & Self-Control: An Essay
for Lee E. Teitelbaum, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 107, for a discussion on self-control as it relates
to family law.
132. John, supra note 41, at 2.
133. See TOTAL SYS. SERVS., INC., 2011 CONSUMER DEBIT RESEARCH: FINAL REPORT OF
SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP RESULTS (2011), available at http://www.tsys.com/
Downloads/upload/2011_TSYS_Mercator_DebitResearch _Final_2.pdf; Gail Cunningham,
Overwhelming Majority of Consumers Would Change Financial Institutions to Avoid Paying Debit Card Fee, NAT’L FOUND. FOR CRED. COUNS. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://financial
education.nfcc.org/2011/11/01/overwhelming-majority-of-consumers-would-change-financial
-institutions-to-avoid-paying-debit-card-fee/.
134. See 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
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A. Leave the Durbin Amendment “As Is”—Cap on the Total Fee
The first option is simple: leave the Durbin Amendment as enacted.135 The final adopted rule provides that the interchange fees
charged cannot exceed the $0.21, plus five basis points of the transaction’s value as a fraud prevention adjustment.136
The costs and benefits of the Durbin Amendment, as it currently
reads, have been discussed throughout this Note.137 The Durbin
Amendment creates overall cost savings for merchants that may
or may not be passed along to the consumers.138 These savings are
taken from the revenue of the card-issuing banks.139 The banks make
up the lost revenue by reducing services or by charging other fees.140
Additionally, merchants with low-priced items would have increased
costs because the interchange fees would not be proportional to the
transaction price.141
The expense of processing each transaction is the same, regardless
of the monetary value. If the cap on interchange fees is set properly,
then this method can accurately reflect the cost per transaction.142
However, even assuming a cap on the interchange fees may accurately represent the actual cost per transaction, it does not meet the
Durbin Amendment’s stated goal: to create a “reasonable and proportional” interchange fee.143 Better interchange fees would spread these
costs out more fairly based on the price of the transaction.144
B. Repeal the Durbin Amendment—No Caps
Under the next option, there would be no regulation of the
debit card interchange fees, and the debit card interchange fees
would return to pre-amendment status. This option ignores any
problem that was present, or assumes there was none, before the
Durbin Amendment.

135. See supra Part II.B for a more thorough explanation of the Durbin Amendment.
136. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,404 (July 20,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
137. See supra Part IV.
138. See supra Part IV.A.
139. See supra Part IV.C.
140. See supra Part IV.C.
141. See supra Part IV.B.
142. See supra Part III.A (discussing how a debit card transaction works, which illustrates that the dollar value of the transaction is irrelevant to the cost to the parties).
143. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010).
144. See infra Part V.E for a discussion of a suggested interchange fee that is both
reasonable and proportional.
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Without regulation, the market would set and determine the percentage of the fees, and larger corporations would get volume discounts. One could definitely argue that this area does not need regulation.145 Sometimes the best solution is no solution, because the
powers of the market will come to the most equitable solution. However, due to the “big two” controlling the market—Visa and MasterCard—the debit card market faces a potential problem for antitrust
issues. The big two likely will not set the interchange fees at the most
equitable point, because there is little, if any, competition in the
market to balance their interests.
Another concern regarding a climate without regulation is that,
due to this fee’s hidden nature, it has the potential for abuse by the
card-issuing bank. Since merchants, and especially consumers, are
not easily apprised of the exact amount of fees, they might be less
sensitive to a change in the price of interchange fees, and the fees
could rise in increments small enough to go unnoticed. Also, merchants are relatively price inelastic because they want to accept debit
cards for the ease and convenience provided to their customers.
C. No Interchange Fee
Another option would be to prohibit interchange fees. Under this
option, debit cards would be similar to checks, which clear “at par.”146
Some scholars suggest that all debit interchange fees should be abolished.147 These transactions could instead clear at par, like checks;148
however, debit cards provide multiple additional features that checks
do not. First, with a check, a merchant has no added knowledge
about a consumer’s financial position and bears the risk that there
might not be enough money in the checking account to cover the cost
of the purchase.149 Therefore, a merchant has less information in a
check transaction than it does in a debit card transaction.150 Second,
depositing a check is not automatic, and merchants have to manually
145. Scholars, such as Milton Friedman, might argue that a free market is the best
solution to many economic problems, and that unregulated trade and business is far better
than any artificial regulations the government can create. See e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 182 (2002); MILTON FRIEDMAN
& ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT (1990).
146. The merchant would receive the full value of the check without fees. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1316. However, this ignores the fact that debit cards offer advantages of convenience, as well as assuring the merchant that there are available funds. Epstein, supra
note 22, at 29.
147. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1322.
148. Id.; see also id. at 1322-24 (explaining why Georgetown University Law Center
Professor, Steven Salop’s, argument to abolish all debit interchange fees so the transactions clear at par is faulty).
149. Id. at 1317. Consumers will also pay an additional fee if their checks bounce.
150. Id.
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transfer the checks to their own banks. Debit card transactions automatically place funds in a merchant’s bank. Third, check writing is
time-consuming and slows down the checkout process, which might
require merchants to staff more employees.151
A bigger problem with this option is that it only amplifies the revenue problem for debit card-issuing banks. These banks would either
move away from offering debit cards as a payment option, or they
would make up the lost revenue in other ways. Although debit cards
are similar to checks in some regards, they provide more benefits
than checks, and these services need to be funded in some way.
D. Cap the Percentage of the Transaction152
Another alternative to the current Durbin Amendment is to place
a cap on the percentage of the transaction price when calculating interchange fees, instead of capping the total fees allowed. This cap
could be used to artificially simulate a truly competitive market. Also, this option would likely differ from the option to eliminate the
Durbin Amendment only in the sense that the percentage of the
transaction price would likely be lower, because the current market
is not truly competitive.153
Using a percentage of the transaction’s interchange fees does
achieve the Durbin Amendment’s goal of proportionality. However,
as shown in Figure 1, calculating the interchange fee as a percentage
of the transaction price154 grows without bounds. Therefore, it
does not meet the Durbin Amendment’s stated goal of creating a reasonable interchange fee.155 For higher-priced items, the interchange
fees do not accurately represent the costs to the card-issuing bank for
the transaction.
E. Double Cap: Cap Percentage of the Transaction Price and Total
Interchange Fee
The final option—a double cap on interchange fees—is optimal.
This option suggests adjusting the current Durbin Amendment
to more closely match the goal of being “reasonable and proportional.” The proposed adjustment would cap the ad valorem percent151. Id. Not surprisingly, use of checks has decreased since the mid-1990s. Debit Card
Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
152. This Note recommends this option as the second-best option.
153. See supra Part III.B.
154. The Before Amendment line is an interchange fee based on the percentage of the
transaction price.
155. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010).
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age,156 while capping the total value of the interchange fees.157 The
total cap should be higher than the current $0.21, and the cap on the
percentage should be slightly lower than the percentages set by the
free market.158
For example, the regulation could state that there is a 1% interchange fee, with a cap of $0.50 per transaction.159 As shown in
Table 2 and Figure 1 below, the interchange fee under the hypothetical double-cap system is lower than the pre-Durbin Amendment fee,
regardless of the transaction cost, because the percentage
has been lowered. The hypothetical double-cap system has lower interchange fees than the Durbin Amendment fees at both low and
high transaction costs, using mid-range charges to compensate for
the lost revenue.
Table 2:
BEFORE DURBIN
AMENDMENT

AFTER DURBIN
AMENDMENT –
FEE CAP PLUS
FRAUD
PREVENTION

Interchange fee of
1.15% per transaction 160

Interchange fee of
$0.21 per transaction plus 0.05%

Hypothetical interchange fee of 1% with
cap of $0.50

$1

$0.0115

$0.2105

$0.01

PRICE OF
TRANSACTION

HYPOTHETICAL FEE
WITH TOTAL CAP AND
PERCENTAGE CAP

$5

$0.0575

$0.2125

$0.05

$10

$0.115

$0.215

$0.10

$15

$0.1725

$0.2175

$0.15

$20

$0.23

$0.22

$0.20

$25

$0.2875

$0.2225

$0.25

$0.437

$0.229

$0.38

161

$38

156. This is to create a more proportional interchange fee.
157. This is to create a more reasonable interchange fee that reflects the true cost
per transaction.
158. This can be seen infra Figure 1 by the less steep slope of the percentage. The
graph also shows that the interchange fee will always be smaller than before the
Durbin Amendment.
159. There is no specific math or empirical study to support these numbers. They were
selected because the percentage of 1% is slightly below the 1.5% the free market set and
the cap was higher than the $0.21 cap set by the current Durbin Amendment. It is likely
that the true cost per transaction is lower than $0.50 but as explained infra Part V.E, the
cap on the total should be set higher than the exact cost per transaction in order to offset
the transactions where the interchange fee falls below the cost per transaction.
160. This is just one example of the average interchange fee. NORTH, supra note 22, at
12. Another source stated that the average interchange fee was 1.35%. Epstein, supra note
22, at 25.
161. The average purchase price for all debit transactions is $38. NORTH, supra note
22, at 12.
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HYPOTHETICAL FEE
WITH TOTAL CAP AND
PERCENTAGE CAP

$50

$0.575

$0.235

$0.50

$100

$1.15

$0.26

$0.50

$250

$2.875

$0.335

$0.50

$500

$5.75

$0.46

$0.50

Figure 1: Comparison of Three Different Options for the Interchange
Fee162

The cap on the total amount of interchange fees is designed to reflect the fact that the cost per transaction is the same, regardless of
the transaction’s monetary value. The cap that can be charged should
take into account more costs than the current cap does.163 The current
formula does not include using fixed costs to implement and maintain the process for debit card transactions, and it also excludes
large, non-electronic variable costs, such as customer service, billing,
and advertising.164 The cap on the total amount of interchange fees
should also be set higher than the exact cost per transaction, so as to
offset those transactions with interchange fees below the cost per
162. This graph is a visual aid that demonstrates the differences between the interchange fees both before and after the Durbin Amendment, and one possible suggestion
using the percentage-cap and total-cap option. As noted supra note 161, there is no specific
math or empirical study used to support the suggested interchange fees. The graph is included merely to illustrate the properties of the double-cap approach.
163. The cap should be higher than the $0.21 under the Durbin Amendment because it
takes more costs into consideration.
164. Epstein, supra note 22, at 26.
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transaction. In order to prevent the banks from withholding debit
cards because they do not make any profit, the caps should be set
slightly higher than the actual costs per transaction.165
The cap on the percentage will likely be slightly lower than the
percentages set by the free market.166 This “free” market is not truly
free, because of the few power players that control the market, such
as MasterCard and Visa. The goal of a lower percentage is to more
fairly represent what the percentage would be under a free market.
However, it is possible that a regulation with the same, or slightly
higher, percentage would accomplish the same double-cap goals as a
proportional fee for lower-cost items, and a reasonable fee for higherpriced items. This should be discussed in the rulemaking process.
A potential problem with this solution is that the debit cardissuing banks would still have a slight issue generating revenue, because the interchange fees on low-priced items would not cover the
cost per transaction and would lose some of the fees that were above
the cost per transaction.167 One solution to this problem is to set the
cap on the total above-the-average cost to account for the lowerpriced items.
Some might argue this imputes a windfall of fees on lower-priced
items, but allowing this windfall might be better than creating a
burden on these lower-priced transactions. The cost of these lowerpriced items has a greater effect on consumers with moderate-to-low
incomes.168 The goal of this solution is to reallocate the burden more
proportionally. This would eliminate the current problem of
merchants that sell low-priced items, such as Redbox, coffee shops,
and convenience stores, placing a disproportionate burden on their
profit margins.
Another problem with this solution is that it does not solve the
small-bank-exemption problem. Any restriction placed on the interchange fees that lowers them will place additional pressure on the
smaller banks. This pressure might force some of these banks out of
the market, or it might force them to use other methods to generate
revenue. Some small banks might still want to offer debit card services, even if they are generating little or no revenue on that service,
because they would not want to lose customers. Even assuming there
are no regulations on debit card interchange fees, larger banks might
165. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of two-sided markets.
166. This is shown supra Figure 1 by the flatter slope of the percentage. The graph also
shows that the interchange fee would always be smaller than it would have been before the
Durbin Amendment.
167. Under the example given in the first paragraph supra Part V.E, a transaction of
$1 would have an interchange fee of one cent, which is likely not enough to cover the
transaction costs.
168. John, supra note 41, at 2.
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pressure the smaller banks out of the market, because a larger
bank’s ability to spread its fixed costs over more transactions will always result in lower costs per transaction.
This option could also continue the fraud-prevention incentive.169
However, this Note suggests altering that incentive to increase the
cap by a certain amount, accurately reflecting the added cost per
transactions. This incentive likely would not affect lower-priced
transactions. If the fraud-prevention measures are variable costs and
not fixed costs, then the increase in the cap might need to be an
amount greater than the cost per transaction in order to compensate
for the number of transactions below the cap.
Under this double-cap scheme, it would not be necessary to allow
merchants to set minimum-purchase prices for consumers to use credit
cards or debit cards, because the fee would return to a percentage of
the purchase price, just like it did before the Durbin Amendment.
Merchants and consumers stand to benefit from this because, under that scheme, merchants would be more willing to accept any
method of payment from consumers. For example, merchants that sell
furniture, a high-priced item, would have a $0.50 interchange fee,
which would not noticeably cut into their profit margins. Consumers
also stand to benefit because they could use their cards for smaller
purchases without having to meet some threshold. For example, merchants that sell something for $1, a low-priced item, would only be
charged $0.01, which is a small proportion of the price.170
A double cap on the interchange fees is the optimal alternative
because it eliminates disproportionate interchange fees on low-priced
items while lowering the excessive interchange fees on high-priced
items. Placing a double-cap on the interchange fees would result in a
reasonable and proportional fee.
VI. CONCLUSION
Senator Durbin and other members of Congress saw a problem
with the debit card interchange fees, so they recommended an
additional provision to the Dodd-Frank Act, seeking to “help small
businesses, merchants, and consumers by providing relief from high
interchange fees for debit card transactions.”171 The Durbin Amend-

169. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010); supra Part II.B.3.
170. Contrast this with an interchange fee of $0.21, which is 21% of a merchant’s potential revenue. A merchant’s revenue will decrease by 21% before even considering the
merchant’s operating costs.
171. 156 CONG. REC. S3695 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard
Durbin); see also 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Richard Durbin).
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ment attempts to protect consumers and merchants from hidden
interchange fees.
This Note does not suggest changing the goals of the Durbin
Amendment, but instead, it suggests altering the Board’s final regulation. The optimal regulation would more closely match the Durbin
Amendment’s goal of reasonableness and proportionality while considering the card issuer’s cost per transaction. This Note suggests
placing a double cap on interchange fees, which would be reasonable
because it regulates the entire chargeable amount and proportional
because it is based on a stated percentage of the purchase price.

